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An election that is “disputed” lacks two qualities after Election Day: a clear 
winner and a concession. These elections instead depend on legal processes—
recounts, court proceedings, and more—for resolution. As a result, when a 
sitting President, running for reelection, becomes immersed in a disputed 
presidential election, he potentially enjoys an advantage over his opponent. He 
can attempt to exploit the powers of the presidency to push these legal 
proceedings in his favor.  
As a practical matter, this advantage can be formidable. A sitting president 
can resort to his extraordinary bully pulpit, for example, to influence public 
sentiment. This advantage shrinks, however, with respect to the President’s 
official powers—the legal authorities that the President can wield by virtue of 
his role in government.1 Here, a sitting President’s advantage over his opponent, 
at least after Election Day, is slight. As this Essay explains, the President’s 
powers over a disputed presidential election are not primarily legal in nature; 
they are political. And, accordingly, so are the means to push back. 
Prior to Election Day, the President enjoys considerable power over how 
elections in the United States are designed, administered, and regulated. For 
example, the President can use his nomination and removal powers to affect the 
implementation of landmark voting rights statutes, which potentially reach into 
every crevice of election administration. He can refuse to offer nominees for 
leadership positions in order to hamstring agencies charged with election-related 
regulation. He can decide unilaterally whether to impose sanctions in response 
to important forms of election interference. The list goes on.2 These forms of 
control are important. Yet their reach generally ends at Election Day. These 
powers do not allow a President to influence the resolution of discrete election 
disputes that might subsequently emerge.  
Importantly, moreover, the President is able to exercise these limited powers 
over election administration not due to some freestanding power. Instead, he is 
able to wield this authority because Congress authorized it. As relevant, 
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, the Federal Election Campaign Act, the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and more. Each of these 
statutes empowers the Executive Branch. As a result, each statute, in one way 
or another, necessarily empowers the President.3 
With respect to post-election disputes, however, Congress has enacted no 
statute granting analogous authority to the Executive Branch. Nor does the 
Constitution provide such power. Instead, the Constitution and Congress have 
combined to produce a framework for resolving elections—including 
presidential elections—that, once Election Day has come and gone, cuts the 
President out almost entirely. Consider, at the outset, disputes over how ballots 
cast for presidential electors should be counted, recounted, or otherwise 
resolved. During this stage, the states remain in charge, with courts often playing 
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an important adjudicatory role.4 Consider, next, disputes emanating out of the 
Electoral College. Here, Congress serves as the decisionmaker, with the Vice 
President (perhaps) serving as a meaningful actor.5 Finally, consider disputes 
that might survive even after Congress has met. At this point, January 20 
provides an automatic cutoff. If, by that time, “a President shall not have been 
chosen,”6 there is no legal ambiguity regarding the tenure of the sitting 
president. It simply ends. Throughout this two-and-a-half-month process, 
between Election Day and the date of inauguration, the law empowers many 
actors to make decisions in the course of resolving the presidential dispute. It 
does not, however, empower the President. Even if these actors fail to fulfill 
their decision-making responsibilities—even if Congress, for example, fails to 
resolve disagreements emerging from the Electoral College7—the law does not 
respond to such a crisis by empowering the person who happens to be occupying 
the Oval Office.  
The few areas where the President does have some official role in post-
election disputes help to confirm just how limited this role is. To take one 
example, the President nominates candidates for the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC). The EAC, in turn, provides information and funding to 
states seeking to improve their recount procedures. This work is important. But 
it all occurs outside the context of a particular disputed election, and the EAC 
lacks the ability to force jurisdictions to take one approach over another with 
respect to disputed elections. The Executive Branch also plays a central role in 
presidential transitions. This potentially charged arrangement is a result not only 
of historical norms and practical considerations, but also constitutional 
mandates and statutory requirements. The Presidential Transition Act, for 
example, requires the President, well before the election, to establish a “White 
House transition coordinating council,” which in turn takes on a host of 
transition-related duties. If a President, facing down a disputed presidential 
election, decides to slow down or even stall this process of transition, the law is 
sufficiently equivocal—or at least unsettled—to allow substantial latitude to 
him and others in the Executive Branch.8 Yet even if a President were to engage 
in such resistance through January 20, the effect would be to undercut the work 
of the incoming administration, not to prevent its installation. As this practical 
consequence helps to confirm, these discrete areas of presidential control are 
significant. Yet none of them empowers the President, in a meaningful way, to 
control the legal resolution of a disputed presidential election. 
Of course, modern U.S. Presidents also enjoy an astounding collection of 
powers that do not necessarily relate to elections. These powers are so 
numerous, expansive, and unsettled on the margins that it would be impossible 
to identify them all in a definitive manner. Contemplating this broad range of 
legal powers running to the Executive Branch, a President may begin to wonder 
if he can redeploy these authorities in a manner that could push a disputed 
presidential election in his favor. Perhaps a President would look to leverage his 
influence over how funds are distributed to states, for example, or even his 
control over the military, in an effort to improve his chances after Election Day. 
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Yet even if a President were willing to go down this path, it is unclear how, 
exactly, he could use these broad powers to affect the resolution of a disputed 
presidential election. Such an observation assumes, of course, that the President 
works within the bounds of the law—an assumption that, as addressed below, 
may not necessarily hold. 
In short, a President seeking to leverage his office in response to a disputed 
presidential election does not have, in his otherwise vast toolkit, law-based 
mechanisms likely to advance his cause. He likely will have more success 
turning to political pressure. In this context, the President finds a wealth of 
opportunity. A President first could turn to state and local officials, trying to 
pressure these individuals into conducting post-election proceedings in a 
manner that improves his chances. He could even attempt, for example, to 
convince a state legislature simply to throw out the popular vote and appoint his 
preferred electors.9 A President also could turn to Congress, in response to 
proceedings at the Electoral College, and try to convince congressional 
representatives to resolve any lingering disputes in his favor. And, of course, the 
President could lean heavily on the Vice President, who technically is elected 
separately from the President but whose own political fortunes almost certainly 
coincide. Unlike the President, these other political actors do have legal 
mechanisms at their disposal able to meaningfully affect and even resolve a 
disputed presidential election.10 A President hoping to exploit these legal 
mechanisms through sheer political clout has decent odds of making a 
difference; he is an extraordinarily important public figure and the de facto head 
of his political party. Yet even the most politically powerful President still lacks 
legal authority to compel these decisions. He must rely on other, independent 
actors to choose to make them. And it is very possible that countervailing 
political pressures or other forces, simultaneously directed at these same actors, 
would be strong enough to resist the President’s efforts. 
It is in response to such fortitude that an unscrupulous President might 
attempt, in a sense, to combine his political and legal leverage into something 
more ominous: to threaten to withhold funding, for example, to any state whose 
representatives are resisting his political pressure; or to attempt to use his control 
over the military and other federal actors to extort relevant officials. A President 
even could purport to declare state of emergency—something akin to martial 
law—that, he might try to claim, allows him to act beyond constitutional 
constraints. If a President takes such steps, however, he is no longer exercising 
lawful authority, even if he tries to frame his actions as such. Instead, he is 
exploiting his legal proximity to funding decisions, to law enforcement and the 
military, and to the presidential office more generally in a manner that cannot 
be reconciled with law. The President, in this scenario, is acting unlawfully. The 
legal question therefore becomes one of remedy.  
In this situation, it is likely that the normal, legal avenues for recourse—via 
the courts, impeachment proceedings, and, of course, elections themselves—
would be unavailable or inadequate. In that case, the question becomes less 
about the law, which in a sense has failed, and more about politics. Will the 
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other political actors stand for this lawlessness? Will the electorate? If not, what 
will they do—perhaps also outside the bounds of the law—to push back?  
In light of these dynamics, the upshot becomes clear: to the extent that a 
President can exploit his office to influence a disputed presidential election, it 
is not through law-based means. The President has essentially no legal authority, 
by virtue of his office, to control the resolution of disputed presidential 
elections. He also has no legal authority to control the decisions of officials who 
will dictate the outcome of such disputes. The President instead must operate 
through legal channels (such as local election boards and the courts) that are 
equally available to the candidate who is opposing him; or he must act indirectly, 
through political pressure. And while the political playing field—between an 
incumbent and an outsider candidate—is hardly level, it is very much still a 
competition. In short, a sitting President likely does have a meaningful 
advantage over an outsider in a disputed presidential election. But that 
advantage starts, and very well may end, with politics.  
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